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I.

Statement of the casco
This case involves the question of whether a reservation of "all the oil, gas, and

minerals, in, on, or under the surface of said lands . . ." in a 1946 warranty deed included a
reservation of the geothermal resources underlying the deeded property. There is no extrinsic
evidence regarding the intent of the parties at the time the warranty deed was created.
II.

Course of proceedings.
Ida-Therm's description of the course of the proceedings is accurate.

III.

Statement of facts.
On or about March 19, 1946, Arthur 1. Bell and his wife Vinnie O. Bell conveyed

land to C.C. Mann by a warranty deed ("the 1946 Bell Deed").

In the 1946 Bell Deed, Arthur

and Vinnie Bell reserved to themselves "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface
of said lands .... " R, Vol. I, p. 166.
The individual Defendants in the action below are the successors of Arthur and
Vinnie Bell, and are now the owners of the oil, gas and mineral rights reserved in the 1946 Bell
Deed. DefendantiCounterclaimantiRespondent Bedrock Geothermal, LLC ("Bedrock") leased
geothermal rights for the real property involved in the 1946 Bell Deed from the individual
Defendants. R, Vol. I, pp. 13-16.
Plaintiffs Mann and Kolbet in the action below are the holders of the surface
estate pursuant to the 1946 Bell Deed, and Plaintiffs asserted in the Complaint below that the
deed's reservation of mineral rights did not include geothermal rights. Based on this position,
they entered into geothermal leases with Plaintiff/Counterdefendanti Appellant Ida-Therm, LLC
("Ida-Therm"). R, Vol. I, pp. 11-12.
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Defendants denied Plaintiffs' claim, and Bedrock counterclaimed for declaratory
judgment that it properly leased the geothermal rights for the subject property by virtue of the
individual Defendants' acquisition of the mineral rights reserved in the 1946 Bell Deed,
declaratory judgment that Plaintiff Ida-Therm LLC's geothermal rights leases from Plaintiffs
Mann and Kolbet were void as a result, and judgment quieting title to the geothermal resources
in it as against Plaintiffs. R, Vol. I, p. 121.
In response to discovery requests, Plaintiffs acknowledged that they possess no
extrinsic evidence regarding the grantors' intent at the time of creation of the 1946 Bell Deed. R,
Vol. I, pp. 187-188.
Bedrock moved for summary judgment on February 17,2011. R, Vol. I, p. 137.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order dated May 26, 2011, the District Court granted
Bedrock's motion. R, Vol. II, p. 251.
After discussing the fact that most states have found the term "mineral" to be
unambiguous and read broadly, the District Court concluded that it would be "injudicious to
conclude that the term mineral is ambiguous." Such a holding, the District Court stated, would
"unnecessarily encourage litigation to determine the scope of grants or reservations similar to
that of the Bell Deed." It reviewed with approval authority from other states holding that: (a) a
reservation of "all minerals" imports an intent to convey only the surface rights and sever it from
the mineral estate, meaning all commercially valuable substances separate from the soil; (b) a
"functional" approach focused on the purposes and expectations generally attendant to mineral
estates and surface estates was preferable over a "mechanistic" approach based on textbook
definitions of the term "mineral"; (c) functionally, geothermal resources are more like oil, gas
and coal, are not necessary for the enjoyment of the surface estate, and may be exploited without
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destroying the surface estate; and Cd) under federal law, geothermal resources are generally
grouped with other minerals. The District Court rejected Defendants' argument that geothermal
resources were not reserved because they were not specifically mentioned, reasoning that the
term "minerals" is a general term describing a category of resources, and if that category could
be interpreted to include geothermal resources, they were reserved. The District Court also
rejected Defendants' argument that the decision in Stucki v. Parker, 108 Idaho 929 (1985),
stands for the proposition that the surface estate may only be severed from the mineral estate by
an express grant or reservation of the "surface."

Finally, the Court rejected Defendants'

assertion that the definition of "geothermal resources" used in the Idaho Geothermal Resources
Act, I.C. § 42-4002, controls, agreeing with Bedrock that the statutory definition is not
applicable to the interpretation of a deed which pre-dates the statute and that the Idaho
Legislature has acted inconsistently, including geothermal resources within the meaning of
"minerals" in I.C. § 47-701. R, Vol. II, pp. 251-269.
IV.

Issues presented on appeal.

1.

Did the District Court correctly conclude that the reservation in the 1946

Bell Deed of "all the oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of said lands . . . "
unambiguously included geothermal resources?
2.

Did the District Court correctly conclude that the decision in Stucki v.

Parker is not relevant because it expressly deals only with a limited grant of the surface estate
and does involve interpretation of the term "minerals" or the scope of a reservation of all
minerals?
3.

Did the District Court correctly conclude that the Geothermal Resources

Act, enacted well after the 1946 Bell Deed and dealing with the regulation of the development of
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geothermal resources,

IS

not relevant to the scope of a mineral reservation

111

a private

conveyance?
V.

Standard of review.
Ida-Therm' s statement of the standard of review is accurate.

VI.

Argument.
A.

The reservation of all "minerals ... in, on, or under the
surface" in the 1946 Bell Deed unambiguously evidences
the general intent to sever the surface estate from rights
to commercially valuable substances, including
geothermal rights.

The sole issue in this case is whether the reservation of mineral rights in the 1946
Bell Deed included geothermal rights (in which case such rights are rightfully owned by the
individual Defendants and leased to Bedrock).
The Idaho Supreme Court has summarized the process for interpreting a deed:
In interpreting a deed of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek
and give effect to the real intention of the parties. See Gardner v.
Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 770, 450 P.2d 990,993 (1969); Bumgarner
v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 637, 862 P.2d 321, 329 (Ct. App.
1993). Where a deed is ambiguous, interpretation of the grantor's
intent is a question of fact determined from the instrument itself, as
well as from the surrounding facts and circumstances. See Latham
v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 857, 673 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1983); Dille
v. Doerr Dist. Canst., 125 Idaho 123, 125, 867 P.2d 997, 999 (Ct.
App. 1993). Where a deed is unambiguous, however, the parties'
intent must be ascertained from the language of the deed as a
matter of law without resort to extrinsic evidence. See id.; see
also Gardner, 92 Idaho at 770, 450 P.2d at 993 (stating that if the
language of a deed is plain and unambiguous the intention of the
parties must be ascertained from the deed, and parol evidence, that
is, documentary, oral or real evidence extrinsic to the deed itself, is
not admissible to ascertain intent); Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847,
854, 934 P .2d 20, 27 (1997) (noting that "there is no need to resort
to extrinsic evidence to interpret or modify the terms of what
appears to be a clearly written document").
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C & G. Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766 (2003). It is undisputed in this case that no extrinsic
evidence of the grantor's intent.
Ida-Therm first contends that the 1946 Bell Deed's reservation of all minerals
unambiguously did not include geothermal resources. It reaches this conclusion based on the
fact that the Deed reservation does not explicitly include the words "geothermal resources." This
argument was correctly rejected by the District Court. Ida-Therm's assertion that the "plain
meaning" of "minerals" does not include geothermal resources is circular and unsupported by
any authority. It begs the question of what "minerals" means, without ever attempting to answer
that question other than to state in conclusory fashion that it does not include geothermal
resources.
Ida-Therm's argument ignores the extremely broad nature of the reservation in the
1946 Bell Deed. Read in context, it is clear that the reservation is intended to cover every
valuable substance that may be removed anywhere from the land without destroying the surface
estate, through any available means. The Deed first reserves "all the oil, gas and minerals" and
expands upon this reservation by including the modifier "in, on, or under, the surface of said
lands[.]" It then goes on to make clear that it includes "all the rights of ownership therein," the
right of removal of all such substances, whether by "mining, developing or operating," and the
right of "erection [on the property] of "all necessary buildings, pipelines, machinery and
equipment necessary in and about the business of mining, developing or operating, for any of
said products[.]" This broad language supports the conclusion of a general intent by the parties
to sever the surface and subsurface estates, inclusive of geothermal resources.
Courts in other jurisdictions have long recognized that a reservation of "all
minerals" is intended to entirely sever the surface and subsurface estates. For example, the
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Kentucky Supreme Court stated over seventy years ago that a reservation of "all minerals"
"clearly imports an intention to convey only the surface rights and to reserve all minerals. In
other words, the deed separated the mineral estate from the surface." Maynard v. McHenry, 271
Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938). Similarly, the Comi in Spurlock v. Santa Fe P. R.R., 143 Ariz.
469,694 P.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1984), stated, "We believe a reservation of 'all minerals whatsoever'
reflects a general intent of the parties to sever the surface estate from the underlying mineral
estate," and reasoned that such a reservation "indicates that the parties intended to create two
distinct, coexisting, and individually valuable estates. Thus, the grantor retains ownership of all
commercially valuable substances separate from the soil, while the grantee assumes ownership
ofa surface that has value in its use and enjoyment." 694 P.2d at 308.
The rule that a reservation of minerals establishes a general intent to sever the
surface and subsurface estates has a long and established history.1.1&., Northern P. R. Co. v.
Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526,536 (1903) (noting that in Hext v. Gill, L.R. 7 Chan. App. 699 (1872),
the House of Lords held that "every substance which can be got from underneath the surface of
the earth for the purpose of profit," was a mineral, "unless there is something in the context or in
the nature of the transaction to induce the court to give it a more limited meaning").
In this case, Arthur and Vinnie Bell reserved to themselves in the 1946 Bell Deed
all "oil, gas, and minerals, in, on, or under the surface of said lands .... "

R, Vol. I, p. 166.

The reference to the "surface," in juxtaposition to the "oil, gas and minerals in, on or under" the
surface being reserved, further evidences the intent to sever the surface estate from the mineral
estate.

Including geothermal resources in the conveyed "surface" rather than the reserved

"minerals" would be illogical and an unreasonable interpretation of the 1946 Bell Deed.
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In Spurlock, the Arizona Court of Appeals observed that the approach of finding
the term "minerals" ambiguous invites unending litigation and other problems.

Spurlock v.

Santa Fe P. R.R., 143 Ariz. 469, 694 P.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1984). The court catalogued those
jurisdictions which in which courts had found the term "minerals" to be ambiguous, and those in
which it had been found to be unambiguous (and read broadly), and noted:
Courts that hold mineral to be an ambiguous term are often thrust
into a complex and hopeless search for the "true intentions" of the
original contracting parties. With the passage of decades and a
series of mesne conveyances, this task can be impossible. And, as
many courts have noted, attempting to discover the paliies' specific
intent regarding a substance that was unknown to anyone at the
time of the original conveyance is antilogical. E.g., Northern Nat.
Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704, 714 (lOth Cir, cert. denied,404
U.S. 951, 92 S.Ct. 268, 30 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971). The most
consistent results produced by these cases are title uncertainty and
the need to litigate each mineral reservation to determine what
substances it encompasses.
694 P.2d at 307. The court concluded that the better approach was to read the term "minerals" as
unambiguous and indicating a broad intent to sever the surface and subsurface estates, noting
that under this approach "title uncertainty is minimized and courts are able to avoid the tortuous
process of attempting to discover the parties' specific intent." rd., citing Moser v. United States
Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
A panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals similarly noted the benefits of
treating the term "minerals" as unambiguous:
The policy considerations in favor of this interpretation are
considerable. An established rule of law provides a reliable means
of ascertaining mineral ownership. This certainty is important
because of the heavy investment of capital required to develop
petroleum and other mineral resources. Without an established rule
of law, the courts would necessarily be called upon to interpret
numerous reservations. This is evident from the series of cases that
result in states following Arkansas authority. With every new
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technology that develops a use for a particular gas or hard rock
mineral, resort is made to the courts. Conservation of judicial
resources is another valuable advantage of [this] rule.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Guild Trust, 636 F.2d 261,265 (lOth Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967,
101 S.Ct. 3123,69 L.Ed.2d 981 (1981).
Here, where all minerals, oil and gas were reserved in the 1946 Bell Deed, a
severance of the surface and subsurface estates was accomplished, and the grantee did not obtain
the geothermal rights. A reservation of a11 minerals is genera11y recognized as accomplishing a
severance of the surface and subsurface estates, with the subsurface estate holder owning a11
commercia11y valuable substances separate from the soil. See, M.,., Spurlock, 674 P.2d at 308;
Calvert Joint Venture #140 v. Snider, 373 Md. 18,50,816 A.2d 854,872 (2003).

The District

Court correctly reached the same result here.
B.

The weight of authority supports the conclusion that
"minerals"
unambiguouslv
includes
geothermal
resources, because such resources are functionally
similar to other minerals and are not necessary to the
use and enjoyment of the surface estate, and because a
broad reading of "minerals" encourages title certainty.

While no Idaho appe11ate court has reached the issue, a number of other courts
have concluded that the term "minerals" includes geothermal resources.

For example, in

Geothermal Kinetics, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 75 Cal. App. 3d 56, 141 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Ct.
App. 1977), the court held that a grant of "a11 minerals in, on or under" the subj ect property
included geothermal resources. The court rejected the surface estate owner's contention that a
geothermal resource is not steam, rocks or the underground reservoir but the heat transported to
the surface by means of steam, and that a "mineral" must have physical substance while heat is
merely a property of a physical substance.

The court accepted the mineral estate owner's

argument that since normally the owner of the mineral estate seeks to extract valuable resources
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 8

from the earth, whereas the surface owner generally desires to utilize land and such resources as
are necessary for his enjoyment of the land, the geothermal resources should follow the mineral
estate.

141 Cal. Rptr. at 880. In reaching this conclusion, the court described the nature of

geothermal resources and geothermal energy, and the manner in which heated steam is
transported to the surface and made ready to exploit. The court then analogized geothermal
resources to oil, gas and other minerals:
Purification of the condensed steam so as to render it safe
for agricultural or domestic purposes is not economically
feasible. Geothermal resources are not necessary or useful
to surface owners, other than as a source of electricity. The
utilization of geothermal resources does not substantially
destroy the surface of the land. The production of the
energy from geothermal energy is analogous to the
production of energy from such other minerals as coal, oil
and natural gas in that substances containing or capable of
producing heat are removed from beneath the earth. In fact,
the wells used for the extraction of the steam are similar to
oil and gas wells.
Id. at 881. Moving on to interpretation of the deed, the court observed that as a general rule, a
grant or reservation of minerals included all minerals found on the premises whether known to

exist or not, and that the exploitation of geothermal resources would not substantially destroy the
surface. The court reasoned that geothermal resources were distinguishable geologically from
the ground water system. It concluded:
The parties to the 1951 grant had a general intention to
convey those commercially valuable, underground,
physical resources of the property. They expected that the
enjoyment of this interest would not destroy the surface
estate and would involve resources distinct from the surface
soil. In the absence of any expressed specific intent to the
contrary, the scope of the mineral estate, as indicated by the
parties' general intentions and expectations, includes the
geothermal resources underlying the property.
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rd. at 882.
Similarly, in R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1076
(Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court quoted the Geothermal Kinetics court's statement: "The
production of energy from geothermal resources is analogous to the production of energy from
such other mineral resources as coal, oil and natural gas in that materials containing energy are
extracted from the earth and transported to facilities where this energy is transformed into
electrical energy. The fact that extracted coal, oil and natural gas contain chemical energy while
geothermal resources contain thermal energy is not significant; uranium ore is not denied the
status of a mineral because it contains nuclear energy instead of chemical energy."
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion, when it
stated: "Salt water and geothermal steam and brines should be held the property of the mineral
owner who owns such substances as oil, gas and coal, since the functions and values are more
closely related. Geothermal steam is a source of energy just as fossil fuels such as oil, gas and
coal are sources of energy." U.S. v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.2d 1271, 1279 (9 th Cir. 1977) (citing
Olpin, The Law of Geothermal Resources, 14 Rocky Mtn. Min. L.I. 123, 140-41 (1968)). The
Tenth Circuit also has concluded that geothermal steam falls within a reservation of minerals
under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act, as did the Ninth Circuit in Union Oil.
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Rosette Inc. v.

United States, 277 FJd 1222 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 878 (2002), although these
cases involve the interpretation of a federal statute rather than a deed. l
The reasoning of the courts in these cases is applicable here, particularly given the
broad nature of the reservation.
C.

The District Court correctly concluded that the decision
in Stucki v. Parker is not relevant.

Ida-Therm next asserts, based on this Court's decision in Stucki v. Parker, 108
Idaho 929 (1985), that a reservation of "all minerals" does not indicate the intent to sever the
surface and subsurface estates, and apparently that such a severance could only occur by a grant
or reservation of the surface itself.

Ida-Therm avoids discussion of the abundant authority

provided by Bedrock to the contrary. In any case, Stucki does not hold as Ida-Therm suggests.
In Stucki, the grantor expressly conveyed the "surface" of certain real estate, but
reserved "all of the phosphate and phosphate rock in the lands above-described." 108 Idaho at
929. The issue in the case was whether the grantee had also acquired all of the mineral rights
except for phosphate and phosphate rock. This Court ruled, sensibly, that an express conveyance
of only the surface would be meaningless if the grantee were held to have also received all
subsurface rights except for the phosphate substances.

According to the Court, because the

grantor "elected to convey specifically the surface rights," it "effectively limited the conveyance
to a transfer of the surface separate and apart from the subsurface" and that the reservation was

Most courts to consider the issue have held that oil and gas are included within the meaning of "minerals"
as used in grants and reservations. See, U, Roth v. Huser, 147 Kan. 433, 76 P.2d 871 (1938); Murray v. Allred,
100 Tenn. 100,43 S.W. 355 (1897). In comparison, those decisions in which the term "minerals" is found not to
include sand and gravel (the heavily majority rule) often base their holding on the fact that exploitation of the sand
and gravel would require destruction of the surface, and therefore unreasonably infringe upon the surface estate,
see, U, Norken Corp. v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1991). Geothermal resources are obviously more akin to
oil and gas than to sand and gravel, as they are accessed and extracted through well drilling, and do not require
substantial destruction of the surface to exploit.
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only a limitation on the surface estate that was conveyed. rd. The Court did not hold that using
the word "surface" in the granting language is the only way to sever the surface and subsurface
estates, and the case has nothing at all to do with the issue here: what is included in the meaning
of "all minerals" in a deed reservation. Stucki deals only with the effect of an expressly limited
granting clause, and is not relevant to the scope of the reservation in this case?
While Ida-Therm's reliance upon the Stucki decision is misplaced, it is worth
noting that, in fact, the word "surface" is distinguished in the reservation language of the 1946
Bell Deed. The reservation provides that the grantors reserve "all the oil, gas, and minerals in,
on or under, the surface of said lands, and all the rights of ownership therein ... "

Contrary to

Ida-Therm' s position (but consistent with its posture regarding the importance of the word
"surface"), this language illustrates the intent to sever the surface and subsurface estates. 3
D.

The Treasure Valley Concrete decision is not relevant,
and resort to extrinsic evidence in everv instance where
a reservation of "all minerals" is made is unwieldy and
encourages disputes.

Next, Ida-Therm asserts that this Court's decision in Treasure Valley Concrete,
Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673 (1998) is "instructive" and should lead the Court to conclude that a
reservation of "all minerals" should be interpreted on a case-by-case basis, apparently requiring
resort to extrinsic evidence in every instance. However, Treasure Valley Concrete deals solely
with the issue of whether, for the purposes of a statute (I.C. § 47-701) reserving to the state
Not surprisingly, the decisions from other jurisdictions upon which the Court relied in Stucki explicitly
involved the meaning of the word "surface." Shell Oil Co. v. Moore, 382 Ill. 556,48 N.E.2d 400 (1943); Jividen
v. New Pittsburg Coal Co., 45 Ohio App. 294, 187 N.E. 124 (1933); Riedt v. Rock Island Improvement Co., 521
P.2d 79 (Okla. 1974); Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App. 1983). They have nothing to do with
the extent of a reservation of "all minerals," as in this case.
In briefmg below, Ida-Therm asserted, incorrectly, that many of the decisions relied upon by Bedrock
holding that geothermal resources were included in the meaning of "minerals" were based in part on the inclusion of
the word "surface" in the deeds in those cases. In fact, as Bedrock showed below, this was not the case at all; the
word "surface" was not included in any of the deeds or involved in the decisions. R., Vol. II, pp. 239-241.
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"minerals" in lands owned by it, sand and gravel were included in the statutory definition of
minerals.

This Court's decision was based entirely on the fact that the statute was amended in

1986 to include sand and gravel in the definition of "minerals." The Court applied the rule of
statutory construction that an amendment carries the presumption that the legislature intended the
statute so amended to have a meaning different than before the amendment, and concluded that
legislature must have intended before 1986 that the definition did not include sand and gravel.
Thus, the decision is entirely a matter of statutory construction.

It has nothing to do with

reservations in mineral deeds not involving state lands, nor does it support the conclusion that a
reservation of "all minerals" should be interpreted anew on a "case-by-case" basis for each
conveyance based on extrinsic evidence.

E.

The District Court correctly concluded that the Idaho
Geothermal Resources Act, I.e. § 42-4002, is
inapplicable.

Finally, Ida-Therm argues at length that the District Court should have "followed"
the definition of geothermal resources contained in the Idaho Geothermal Resources Act, I.C. §
42-4002, and thereby held that the reservation of "all minerals" in the 1946 Bell Deed did not
include geothermal resources. Plaintiffs below asserted in their Complaint that "[p]ursuant to
Idaho law including I.C. § 42-4002(c), geothermal resources are not mineral resources or water
resources." Complaint,

~

56; R, Vol. I, p. 16. While they are difficult to parse, Ida-Therm's

arguments appear to be: (a) the definition of geothermal resources in I.C. § 42-4002 applies to
those resources in all respects, including private conveyances; (b) because I.C. §§ 42-226 and
42-230 reference geothermal resources, geothermal resources "are ground waters owned by the
State" and therefore are not minerals for purposes of a deed reservation (although this directly
contradicts an allegation in the Complaint); (c) the legislative intent behind I.C. § 42-4002
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supports broad application of the definition; and (d) I.C. § 47-701(1)'s definition of "mineral"
(which now expressly includes geothermal resources) supports the conclusion that the term does
not ambiguously include geothermal resources, as used in a deed reservation. None of these
arguments has merit.

1.

I.e. § 42-4002 is expressly limited to application
within Chapter 40 of Title 42, and does not
control the interpretation of terms in a private
conveyance.

Idaho Code § 42-4002 is part of the Idaho Geothermal Resources Act, enacted in
1972, which created a permitting scheme for drilling geothermal wells. I.e. § 42-4002 states that
its definitions are effective "[w]henever used in this act[.]" Of necessity, then, the definitions are
not effective for application elsewhere.
Ida-Therm ignores this limiting language. Its reading would render the language
meaningless, an improper statutory construction.

Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 476

(1986) ("Statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and sentence."); Hartley v.
Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 690 (1984) ("We will not construe a statute in a way which
makes mere surplusage of the provisions included therein.").
While Ida-Therm focuses on the word "found" in I.C. § 42-4002(c), and the
legislative history of the Idaho Geothermal Resources Act, the fact that the Act's definition of
"geothermal resources" is not intended to be of general application (or application beyond the
purposes of the Act itself at all) is made all the more clear by reference to another Idaho statute,
I.C. § 47-701.

It provides that, for the purposes of its chapter (reservation of minerals in

conveyances of state lands), "[t]he terms "mineral lands," "mineral," "mineral deposits,"
"deposit," and "mineral right," ... shall be construed to mean and include all ... geothermal
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resources[.]"

Thus, for some purposes, the legislature has defined "minerals" to include

geothermal resources.
The legislative history quoted by Ida-Therm is irrelevant in light of the
unambiguous language of the Act limiting the application of its definitions.

Citv of Sun Vallev

v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667 (1993) ("We have consistently held that where statutory
language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be
consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.").
To the extent the legislative history is of interest at all, it actually supports
Bedrock's position. As quoted by Ida-Therm, the legislative history clearly reflects that the
legislature only "claims the right to regulate of the development and use" of geothermal
resources, and that the Act "provides for immediate regulation of geothermal resource
exploration and development[.]" Conspicuously absent from these statements of intent is any
reference to the intent to control the rights of parties to instruments of conveyance, or to affect
conveyances that occurred before the creation of the Act. Thus, it is clear that that the legislature
did not intent for the Act to affect the ownership of the right to develop a geothermal resource
underlying a particular property (at least ownership established by contract before the enactment
of the Act).
Ida-Therm next appears to suggest that, because the Idaho Geothermal Resources
Act regulates several aspects of the development and production of geothermal resources, such
as well abandonment, administrative procedures, penalties for regulatory noncompliance, and
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unitization or integration4 , the Act and its definitions must as a result control geothermal
resources in every aspect, including whether the term "minerals" in a deed reservation includes
geothermal resources. Ida-Therm cites no authority for this proposition. In fact, a standard
principle of statutory construction (combined with the clear limiting language discussed above)
leads to the opposite conclusion.

Idaho recognizes the rule of expressio unius est exclusio

alterius - "where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things

excludes all others." Local 1494 of the Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99
Idaho 630, 639 (1978). By addressing in detail the regulation of several aspects of geothermal
resource development and production - but not private conveyances of the rights to those
resources or the interpretation of the instruments of such conveyances - the legislature indicated
the intent not to control those subjects.
2.

I.e. § 42-226 and § 42-230 are irrelevant.

Perplexingly, after asserting in its Complaint and arguing at length earlier in its
briefing that geothermal resources are sui generis in all respects as a result of the definition
contained in I.C. § 42-4002 and therefore not included in the term "minerals" in a deed
reservation, Ida-Thenn then inconsistently asserts that I.C. § 42-230 and § 42-226 applied
together mean that all geothermal resources are ground water. It apparently suggests that as a
result, I.C. § 42-4002 "applies" to all ground water, which to Ida-Therm appears to mean that it
4

Ida-Thenn displays its lack of understanding of the subject when it discusses at length I.C. § 42-4013,
which provides for the forced integration of an area into a drilling unit for development under appropriate
circumstances. This is a common measure in oil and gas development ~ I.C. § 47-322, which contains a similar
provision for oil and gas). Ida-Thenn appears to suggest that the availability of integration somehow means that the
definition of geothennal resources contained in I.e. § 42-4002 controls private conveyances of geothennal rights. In
fact, integration statutes simply recognize that a resource may underlie more than one property, and a property
owner who refuses to participate in the expense and risk of developing the resource should not be pennirted a "free
ride" and receive a pro-rata share of the proceeds of such development. Integration statutes such as I.e. § 43-4013
allow a regulator to impose reasonable conditions on the integrated development, including that the nonparticipating
property owner will be subject to a penalty, to compensate the operator for the expense and risk, before receiving a
pro rata share of the proceeds of a successful well. Integration has absolutely nothing to do with whether the Act
controls interpretation of a private contract for the conveyance of rights in real estate.
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controls conveyances of geothermal rights. It seems to reach this conclusion by virtue of the fact
that I.e. § 42-230 "references directly to" I.e. § 42-4002. The significance of this is not clearly
explained by Ida-Therm.
Ida-Therm's argument misapprehends I.e. § 42-230 and § 42-230. What they
say, quite clearly, is: (a) that all ground water is property of the state; and (b) that some ground
water may be included within the definition of geothermal resources and as a result must be
regulated as such under the Idaho Geothermal Resources Act (but only those of a sufficiently
high temperature). With this Bedrock has no quarrel. Any person who wishes to drill a well to
exploit a geothermal resource must comply with the state's regulation of this activity as
embodied in the Act.

Again, however, this has nothing whatsoever to do with whether a

reservation of "all the minerals" in a 1946 deed includes the rights to geothermal resources
underlying the real property conveyed by that deed. As Bedrock has explained at length, the Act
makes clear that its provisions, including its definition of geothermal resources, do not reach this
subject. Even absent its clear limiting language, the Act's failure to address conveyances of
geothermal rights in the slightest, while addressing regulation of the development and production
of geothermal resources in detail, indicates an intent not to regulate the former subject.
Ida-Therm's argument that the various statutes it describes are in pari materia and
that the purportedly "more specific statute" - which it contends is I.e. § 42-226 - should
"control" over the more general statute is, bluntly, meaningless. First, the various statutes do not
relate to the same subject. I.e. § 42-226 declares state ownership of ground water. I.e. § 42-230
describes some groundwater as geothermal resources and thus subject to regulation as such. I.e.

§ 42-4002 is part of a statutory scheme for the regulation of the development and production of
geothermal resources. In short, they cover different subjects. Even if this were not the case, Ida-
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Therm never clearly explains how I.C. § 42-226 is "more specific" than I.C. § 42-4002, what it is
more specific about, and how it should "control" over I.C. § 42-4002.

Its argument is

unintelligible.
3.

I.e. § 47-701

is relevant only insofar as it confirms that
the definition of geothermal resources in I.e. § 42-2002
is limited in its application.

Finally, Ida-Therm argues that by including "geothermal resources" in its
definition of "minerals," I.C. § 47-701 somehow shows that the term "minerals" does not
unambiguously include geothermal resources. If "minerals" unambiguously included geothermal
resources, Ida-Therm reasons, then there would be no need to mention geothermal resources in
the definition contained in I.C. § 47-701.
Ida-Therm again misapprehends the meamng and purpose of I.C. § 47-701.
Neither Bedrock nor the District Court relied on I.C. § 47-701 for the proposition that "minerals"
unambiguously includes minerals. Rather, both only pointed to it as evidence that the definition
of "geothermal resources" as non-mineral in I.C. § 42-4002 was limited in application to Title
42, Chapter 40. Moreover, I.C. § 47-701 is by its own terms limited in application to Title 47,
Chapter 7. Neither Bedrock nor the District Court asserted otherwise. Abundant other authority
exists for the proposition that the term "all minerals" when used in a deed reservation indicates
the general intent to sever the surface and mineral estates and that geothermal resources are
included in the mineral estate. 5

Ida-Therm again shows its lack of understanding when it argues: "Certainly, the district court would not
also hold 'oil' or 'gas' to be a mineral?" In fact, most courts hold that the term "mineral" when used in a deed
includes oil and gas. See n. 1, supra. This is consistent with the conclusion that reservation of all minerals indicates
the intent to sever the surface estate from all commercially valuable substances separate from the soil which may be
removed from the property.
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F.

The statute relied upon bv Ida-Therm may not be
applied retroactively to change rights established under
a preexisting contract or deed.

In asserting that the Geothermal Resources Act passed twenty six years after the
1946 Bell Deed was created controls the outcome of this case, Ida-Therm ignores entirely the
prohibition against the retroactive application of statutes to vested contract rights.
Statutes may not be applied retroactively unless they clearly provide for such
effect. State v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 105 (2005) (quoting Idaho Code § 73101), which provides, "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared."); Ford v. City of Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 508 (1958) ("Before a statute will be given
retroactive and retrospective effect, the statute itself must contain words which indicate the
Legislature intended it to have such retroactive and retrospective effect."), quoting Application
of Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 158 (1952). 6 The statutes upon which Ida-Therm relies make no such
declaration.
Even if this were not so clear, retroactive application of the statute to modify
preexisting contract rights would be unconstitutional. A statute affects substantive rights and
may not be applied retroactively if it would alter the "'legal effect' of previous transactions or

6
See also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n. 45 (2001) ("[A] statute that is ambiguous with respect to
retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective ... "). The United States
Supreme Court has also stated that the "presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence." Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
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events." Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 695 (1969).7 This prohibition is based in Article I, § 16
of the Idaho Constitution, which provides that "[ n]o ... law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall ever be passed," and by Aliicle I, § 10 of the United States Constitution which provides:
"No state shall .... pass any .... law impairing the obligation of contracts[.]" It has been
interpreted to protect "those contractual obligations already in existence at the time the disputed
law is enacted." Lindstrom v. District Bd. of Health Panhandle Dist. I, 109 Idaho 956, 961 (Ct.
App. 1985); see also In re Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho 797, 810 (1922) ("Legislation that
attempts to make material alterations in the character, terms, or legal effect of existing contracts
is clearly void."); Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 20 (2001) ("It is a fundamental tenet of
contract law that parties to a contract are deemed to have contracted with reference to principles
of law existing at the time the contract was made."); Society for Propagation of the Gospel v.
Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767,2 Gall. 105 (1814) (Story, J.) ("Every statute, which takes away or
impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must
be deemed retrospective.").
The statutes upon which Ida-Therm relies do not relate to private conveyances,
but to permitting of geothermal wells and leasing of geothermal rights on State and school lands.
The statutes themselves expressly state that their definitions are only applicable to the subjects
Compare State v. Daicel Chern. Ind., 141 Idaho at 105 ("A statute that is procedural or remedial and does not
create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy contractual or vested rights is generally held not to be a retroactive statute, even
though it was enacted subsequent to the events to which it operates."). Application of the statutes upon which
Appellants rely would clearly enlarge or diminish "contractual or vested rights," by changing the scope of the
conveyance in the 1946 Bell Deed. A contract's rights are "vested" when the contract is entered into, not when a
claim is made to enforce it. See,~, Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Scott, 161 Ill. App. 3d 372,
381-82, 514 N.E.2d 595 (1987) ("It is well settled that a party's rights under a contract become 'vested' for the
purposes of the retroactive application of a statute when the contract is entered into rather than when the rights
thereunder are asserted. ").
7
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they regulate. As such, they are facially inapplicable to this dispute. Even if this were not so,
the statutes could not be applied retroactively to alter rights vested at the time the 1946 Bell
Deed was executed and delivered. 8 The statutes did not exist at the time of the 1946 Bell Deed,
so the grantors under the deed cannot be said to have acted with them in mind at the time the
deed was created. 9
In short, either the reservation contained in the 1946 Bell Deed included
geothermal resources, in which case the statutes cannot be applied retroactively to change that
contractual reservation of rights, or the reservation did not include geothermal resources as a
matter of contract law, in which case the statutes are irrelevant. Thus, Ida-Therm's statutory
argument is a red herring.

As set forth above, the clear weight of authority indicates that

geothermal resources should be included in the definition of "minerals" for purposes of
interpreting a deed reservation.
VII.

Conclusion.
For the above reasons, the District Court's judgment should be affirmed.

Ida-Therm argued below that the application of a statute enacted in 1972 to determine the parties' rights in
a deed created in 1946 would be merely "remedial." However, it then admitted that the District Court would be
"applying the statute to determine who the geothermal rights belong to." Plaintiffs' Opposition Brief, p. 21; R, Vol.
I, p. 213. This would be exactly what is prohibited - retroactive application of a statute to affect rights established
under preexisting contracts. Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690, 695 (1969).
8

It is entirely consistent, however, to conclude that as the owners of the rights to exploit the geothermal
resources underlying the property, the Bell heirs and their lessees must comply with the permitting and other
regulatory requirements of the Geothermal Resources Act. Imposing permitting and other regulatory requirements
as conditions to the development of the geothermal resources does not deprive them of their vested contract rights.
9
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